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Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation.
Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible
items even when there are two agents, the relaxations envy-freeness up to one
item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) are often considered.
We establish tight lower bounds on the number of allocations satisfying each
of these benchmarks in the case of two agents. In particular, while there can
be as few as two EFX allocations for any number of items, the number of
EF1 allocations is always exponential in the number of items. Our results
apply a version of the vertex isoperimetric inequality on the hypercube and
help explain the large gap in terms of robustness between the two notions.
1 Introduction
The allocation of scarce resources to interested agents is a task that arises commonly in
our everyday lives. Indeed, course slots need to be allocated to university students, grant
funding to researchers, and personnel to organizations, to name but a few examples. A
chief concern when allocating resources is fairness—we want all agents to feel that they
receive a fair share of the resources. Several benchmarks of fairness have been proposed
in the fair division literature. One of the most fundamental benchmarks is envy-freeness,
which means that every agent should receive their first choice among all of the allocated
bundles. Put differently, no agent should have reason to envy any other agent.
While envy-freeness is a compelling fairness benchmark, it suffers from the setback
that it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items such
as books, course slots, or personnel. This is evident in the simple instance where there
are two agents and only one indivisible item to be allocated. Consequently, two natural
relaxations of envy-freeness have been considered. Envy-freeness up to one item (EF1)
demands that any envy that one agent has towards another agent can be eliminated by
removing a single item of our choice from the latter agent’s bundle, while the stronger
notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) requires that the envy can be eliminated by
removing any single item from the latter agent’s bundle. An allocation that satisfies EF1
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and EFX always exists when the items are divided between two agents with arbitrary
valuations over subsets of items [Lipton et al., 2004; Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018].1
The notions of EF1 and EFX serve as fairness criteria that can always be fulfilled
when allocating indivisible items between two agents. On the one hand, given that EFX
provides a stronger fairness guarantee than EF1, one might view it to be the appropriate
criterion in this setting. On the other hand, a series of recent work has shown that EF1
is a more robust criterion than EFX in several ways:
• An EF1 allocation can be computed using a number of queries that is only log-
arithmic in the number of items [Oh et al., 2019]. On the contrary, computing
an EFX allocation takes an exponential number of queries in the worst case
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018], and a linear number of queries even when the
valuations are additive [Oh et al., 2019].
• There always exists a balanced EF1 allocation (that is, the numbers of items that
the two agents receive differ by no more than 1), while an EFX allocation may
necessarily be highly unbalanced [Kyropoulou et al., 2019]. Moreover, when the
agents’ valuations are additive, an EF1 allocation fulfilling a set of cardinality
constraints can also be found [Biswas and Barman, 2018].
• With additive valuations, an EF1 allocation satisfying the economic efficiency
condition of Pareto optimality always exists, i.e., no other allocation makes one
agent better off without making the other agent worse off [Barman et al., 2018;
Caragiannis et al., 2019]. On the other hand, a Pareto-optimal EFX allocation
may not exist [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018]. In addition, requiring EF1 leads to
a smaller social welfare loss than EFX in the worst case [Bei et al., 2019b].
• If the items lie on a line, an EF1 allocation in which each agent receives a contiguous
block of items is guaranteed to exist [Bilo` et al., 2019; Suksompong, 2019]; this is
not the case for EFX. More generally, when the items lie on a graph, the existence
of an EF1 allocation in which every agent receives a connected subgraph can be
guaranteed for a large class of graphs [Bilo` et al., 2019], whereas an EFX allocation
always exists only if the graph is complete [Bei et al., 2019a].
• Beyond the setting of two agents, an EF1 allocation can always be found for any
number of agents [Lipton et al., 2004], whereas the existence question for EFX
remains intriguingly open when there are at least four agents with additive valua-
tions, or three agents with non-additive valuations [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018;
Caragiannis et al., 2019; Amanatidis et al., 2020a,b; Chaudhury et al., 2020].
In this note, we provide an explanation to the robustness of EF1 by deriving tight
lower bounds on the number of EF1 and EFX allocations for arbitrary valuations of the
two agents. Specifically, while there can be as few as two EFX allocations regardless
1The valuations are assumed to be monotonic, i.e., an agent’s value for a set cannot decrease when an
item is added to the set. This assumption is usually made without loss of generality, since agents
can freely dispose of items that they do not like.
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of the number of items, the number of EF1 allocations is—quite surprisingly—always
exponential in the number of items.2
2 The Bounds
In our formal model, there are two agents, who we sometimes call Alice and Bob, and a
set M of m ≥ 1 items. A subset of M is referred to as a bundle. For i ∈ {1, 2}, agent
i has a nonnegative value ui(M
′) for each bundle M ′ ⊆ M . We assume without loss of
generality that ui(∅) = 0 and, as is commonly done, that the valuations are monotonic,
i.e., ui(A) ≤ ui(B) for any A ⊆ B ⊆ M . A bundle M
′ is said to be
• envy-free up to one item (EF1) for agent i, if either ui(M
′) ≥ ui(M\M
′), or there
exists an item j ∈M\M ′ such that ui(M
′) ≥ ui(M\(M
′ ∪ {j}));
• envy-free up to any item (EFX) for agent i, if for each item j ∈ M\M ′, we have
ui(M
′) ≥ ui(M\(M
′ ∪ {j})).
An allocation is an ordered partition of M into two sets (M1,M2), where bundle Mi
is given to agent i. The allocation is said to be EF1 (resp. EFX) if for each i ∈ {1, 2},
bundleMi is EF1 (resp. EFX) for agent i. Moreover, we say that an unordered partition
of M into two sets (M ′,M ′′) is EF1 (resp. EFX) for agent i if both M ′ and M ′′ are EF1
(resp. EFX) for the agent.
We now derive the lower bounds on the number of EF1 and EFX allocations. We
start with the stronger notion, EFX. For any number of agents with identical valu-
ations, Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] showed that an EFX allocation always exists.
This implies that in our setting with two agents, each agent has an EFX partition of the
items, a fact that will be useful for our proof.
Theorem 1. For two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, the number of EFX
allocations is at least 2. Moreover, this bound is tight for any number of items m.
Proof. We let each agent propose an (unordered) EFX partition. If the two proposed
partitions coincide, we have two EFX allocations by assigning either bundle to either
agent. If they differ, letting Bob choose a preferred bundle from Alice’s partition yields
an EFX allocation, and letting Alice choose a preferred bundle from Bob’s partition
yields another EFX allocation different from the first one. Hence we can find two EFX
allocations in both cases.
To show that the bound is tight, assume that the agents have identical valuations with
value 1 for each of the firstm−1 items, and value m for the last item. The valuations are
additive: the value for a bundle of items is simply the sum of the values of the individual
items in the bundle. It is clear that all of the first m − 1 items must be given to the
agent who does not receive the last item in order for the allocation to be EFX. Hence
there are only two EFX allocations in this instance.
2We also remark that several extensions of EF1 have been recently studied, including weighted
EF1 [Chakraborty et al., 2020], typewise EF1 [Benabbou et al., 2019], and democratic EF1
[Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2019].
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Next, we move on to EF1, for which deriving a tight bound is considerably more
challenging.
Theorem 2. For two agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, the number of EF1
allocations is at least fEF1(m), where
fEF1(m) :=


(
m
m/2
)
if m is even;
2 ·
(
m− 1
(m− 1)/2
)
if m is odd.
Moreover, this bound is tight for any number of items m.
To prove this theorem, we will rely on two combinatorial results. The first result is a
version of the vertex isoperimetric problem on the hypercube, where we want to choose
a certain number of vertices on a hypercube so that the “vertex boundary” of this set
is as small as possible. For a finite set X, denote its power set by 2X . A set system is
a subset of 2X . The Hamming distance between two sets A,B ⊆ X is the size of their
symmetric difference:
d(A,B) = |(A\B) ∪ (B\A)|,
and the Hamming distance between two nonempty set systems A,B ⊆ 2X is
d(A,B) = min
A∈A,B∈B
d(A,B).
The Hamming ball of center A ⊆ X and radius r ∈ N ∪ {0} is
Hr(A) := {B ⊆ X | d(A,B) ≤ r}.
A set system B ⊆ 2X is called a Hamming ball of center A ⊆ X and radius r ∈ N if
Hr−1(A) ⊆ B ⊆ Hr(A).
Note the difference between “the Hamming ball” and “a Hamming ball”.
Lemma 3 (Bolloba´s [1986]; Calabro [2004]). Let X be a finite set, and let A,B ⊆ 2X be
nonempty set systems. There exist a Hamming ball A0 with center X and a Hamming
ball B0 with center ∅ such that |A0| = |A|, |B0| = |B|, and d(A0,B0) ≥ d(A,B).
The second result that we will use in our proof concerns Sperner families, i.e., set
systems in which no set contains another. A famous theorem of Sperner [1928] states
that if |X| = n, a Sperner family in 2X can have size at most
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
. Bjo¨rner [1986,
Thm. 2.2] provided more precise information regarding the number of sets of different
sizes that can appear in a Sperner family. For any positive integers n and k, there is a
unique way of writing
n =
(
ak
k
)
+
(
ak−1
k − 1
)
+ · · · +
(
ai
i
)
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so that ak > ak−1 > · · · > ai ≥ i ≥ 1 are integers. We define
∂k−1(n) =
(
ak
k − 1
)
+
(
ak−1
k − 2
)
+ · · · +
(
ai
i− 1
)
and let ∂k−1(0) = 0.
Lemma 4 (Bjo¨rner [1986]). Let X be a set with |X| = n, and let c0, c1, . . . , cn−1 be
nonnegative integers such that at least one is strictly positive. There exists a Sperner
family in 2X with exactly ci members of size i+ 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1 if and only if
∂j+1(· · · ∂n−2(∂n−1(cn−1) + cn−2) + cn−3 · · · ) + cj ≤
(
n
j + 1
)
,
where j is the smallest index such that cj 6= 0.
With Lemmas 3 and 4 in hand, we are now ready to derive the lower bound on the
number of EF1 allocations.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show tightness of the bound. Assume that the agents have
identical valuations, and the value for a bundle of items is simply the sum of the values
of the individual items in the bundle. If m is even, suppose that the agents have value
1 for every item. The EF1 allocations are exactly the allocations that assign m/2 items
to each agent, so there are exactly
(
m
m/2
)
EF1 allocations. For m odd, suppose that the
agents have value 1 for each of the first m− 1 items, and value 0 for the last item. The
first m− 1 items must be split equally between the two agents, while the last item can
go to either agent. Hence there are exactly 2 ·
( m−1
(m−1)/2
)
EF1 allocations.
Next, we proceed to establish the bound. We claim that for each agent, at least
1
2 · fEF1(m) partitions are EF1. Observe that this claim immediately yields the desired
result. To see this, list 12 · fEF1(m) partitions that are EF1 for Alice, and
1
2 · fEF1(m)
partitions that are EF1 for Bob. For a partition that appears in both lists, we can
allocate either part to either agent, giving rise to two EF1 allocations. For a partition
that appears in only one list, we let the other agent choose a preferred bundle from the
partition, giving rise to one EF1 allocation. Hence the number of EF1 allocations is at
least 12 · fEF1(m) +
1
2 · fEF1(m) = fEF1(m).
We now restrict our attention to Alice and prove that at least 12 · fEF1(m) partitions
are EF1 for her. Recall that M denotes the set of all items, and call a bundle M ′ ⊆ M
“good” if the partition (M ′,M\M ′) is EF1 for Alice, and “bad” otherwise. Our goal is
equivalent to showing that at least fEF1(m) bundles are good. A bundle can be bad for
one of two reasons: either it is “too large” (i.e., it is EF1, but its complement is not), or
it is “too small” (i.e., it is not EF1, but its complement is). Note that a bundle is too
small if and only if its complement is too large. In addition, it is easy to check from the
definition of EF1 that if we remove an item from a bundle that is too small, then the
resulting bundle is, as one should expect, also too small. Likewise, if we add an item to
a bundle that is too large, the resulting bundle remains too large.
Consider bundles of items as elements of 2M . We claim that if bundle A is too small
and bundle B is too large, then d(A,B) ≥ 2. To prove this claim, it suffices to show
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that if a bundle is too small, then adding one item to it cannot make it too large.
Assume that bundle A is too small, and let j ∈ M\A. Denoting Alice’s valuation
by u, since A is too small, we have u(A) < u(M\(A ∪ {j})). This is equivalent to
u(M\(A∪{j})) > u((A∪{j})\{j}), which means that u(M\(A∪{j})) is not too small.
Hence A ∪ {j} is not too large, which establishes our claim.
Let A (resp. B) be a set system consisting of all bundles that are too small (resp. too
large). It follows from the preceding paragraph that d(A,B) ≥ 2. By Lemma 3, there
exist a Hamming ball A0 with center M and a Hamming ball B0 with center ∅ such that
|A0| = |A|, |B0| = |B|, and d(A0,B0) ≥ d(A,B) ≥ 2. Moreover, symmetry implies that
|A| = |B|. The number of good bundles is |2M\(A ∪ B)| = |2M\(A0 ∪ B0)|.
Assume first that m is even. Let r be the unique integer such that Hr−1(M) ( A0 ⊆
Hr(M). Since |A0| = |B0|, we have Hr−1(∅) ( B0 ⊆ Hr(∅). Note that Hr−1(M) contains
all bundles of size at least m− (r− 1), and Hr−1(∅) contains all bundles of size at most
r−1. If r ≥ m/2, then since Hr−1(M) ( A0 ⊆ Hr(M), we have that A0 contains at least
one bundle of size m−m/2 = m/2. Moreover, since B0 contains Hr−1(∅), it contains all
bundles of size m/2 − 1. At least one of these bundles has Hamming distance 1 from a
bundle of size m/2 in A0, a contradiction. So r < m/2, which means that no bundle of
size m/2 belongs to A0 ∪ B0. It follows that the number of good bundles is
|2M\(A0 ∪ B0)| ≥
(
m
m/2
)
= fEF1(m).
For the rest of this proof, assume thatm = 2s+1 is odd. As in the previous paragraph,
let r be such thatHr−1(M) ( A0 ⊆ Hr(M) andHr−1(∅) ( B0 ⊆ Hr(∅). If r ≥ s+1, then
A0 contains all bundles of size s+ 1 and B0 contains all bundles of size s, contradicting
d(A0,B0) ≥ 2. If r ≤ s− 1, then no bundle of size s or s+1 belongs to A0 ∪B0. In this
case, the number of good bundles is
|2M\(A0 ∪ B0)| ≥ 2
(
m
s
)
≥ 2
(
m− 1
s
)
= fEF1(m).
Suppose now that r = s. It suffices to prove that A0 contains at most
(m−1
s−1
)
bundles of
size s + 1, and B0 contains at most
(m−1
s−1
)
bundles of size s. Indeed, this would imply
that the number of good bundles is
|2M\(A0 ∪ B0)| ≥ 2
((
m
s
)
−
(
m− 1
s− 1
))
= 2
(
m− 1
s
)
= fEF1(m).
Assume for contradiction that A0 contains t >
(m−1
s−1
)
bundles of size s + 1. By
symmetry, B0 contains t bundles of size s. Since d(A0,B0) ≥ 2, none of these bundles
in B0 can be a subset of any of the t bundles in A0. This means that the 2t bundles
together form a Sperner family in 2M . Applying Lemma 4, we find that
(
m
s
)
≥ ∂s(t) + t > ∂s(t) +
(
m− 1
s− 1
)
,
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or ∂s(t) <
(
m
s
)
−
(
m−1
s−1
)
=
(
m−1
s
)
. Observe that ∂s
((
m−1
s−1
))
= ∂s
((
m−1
s+1
))
=
(
m−1
s
)
.
Since t >
(m−1
s−1
)
, in order to obtain the desired contradiction, we only need to show that
∂k−1(n) is a non-decreasing function of n for any fixed k.
To prove this statement, we proceed by induction on k. The base case k = 1 is trivial.
Assume that the statement holds up to k − 1, and let n1 > n2 be two positive integers.
Write
n1 =
(
ak
k
)
+
(
ak−1
k − 1
)
+ · · ·+
(
ai
i
)
and ∂k−1(n1) =
(
ak
k − 1
)
+
(
ak−1
k − 2
)
+ · · ·+
(
ai
i− 1
)
with ak > ak−1 > · · · > ai ≥ i ≥ 1, and
n2 =
(
bk
k
)
+
(
bk−1
k − 1
)
+ · · ·+
(
bj
j
)
and ∂k−1(n2) =
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk−1
k − 2
)
+ · · ·+
(
bj
j − 1
)
with bk > bk−1 > · · · > bj ≥ j ≥ 1. If ak = bk, the claim follows from the induction
hypothesis applied to the two integers n1 −
(ak
k
)
> n2 −
(ak
k
)
. If ak > bk, we have
∂k−1(n1) ≥
(
ak
k − 1
)
≥
(
bk + 1
k − 1
)
=
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk
k − 2
)
=
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk − 1
k − 2
)
+
(
bk − 1
k − 3
)
= . . .
=
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk − 1
k − 2
)
+ · · ·+
(
bk − k + j + 1
j
)
+
(
bk − k + j + 1
j − 1
)
≥
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk−1
k − 2
)
+ · · ·+
(
bj+1
j
)
+
(
bj+1
j − 1
)
≥
(
bk
k − 1
)
+
(
bk−1
k − 2
)
+ · · ·+
(
bj+1
j
)
+
(
bj
j − 1
)
= ∂k−1(n2).
Else, ak < bk. A similar chain of inequalities as above shows that n2 ≥ n1, which
is impossible. It follows that ∂k−1(n1) ≥ ∂k−1(n2), concluding the induction and our
proof.
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